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ECONOMICS OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
AND SMALL BUSINESS
DAVID NOVICK* AND J. Y. SPRINGERt
Since the end of World War II and particularly since the Korean incident, mili-
tary procurement has achieved a peace-time volume never before contemplated in our
history. This high level of activity and the likelihood that it will continue for a
long time give defense spending a new importance in the national economy, and
especially in selected industries-such as electronics, airframes, ships, or jet and rocket
power plants. Under these conditions, it is logical that small business should
seek participation in this new and large opportunity, since it always has been in
competition to serve other kinds of economic demands.
This paper examines the magnitude and nature of military procurement and the
special commercial considerations involved. The analysis concentrates on specialized
military equipment and gives only passing attention to the problems of doing busi-
ness with the military in such commodities as shoes, clothing, typewriters, meat and
vegetable products, and a multitude of other items the services buy that are similar
to or identical with standard articles of commerce.
The main concern of this study, therefore, is centered on the economics of pro-
curement of weapons and the related and specialized equipment essential to their
operation. It will of necessity include components, materials, special products, and
services required for weapons and their directly related equipment.
This leads to consideration of the weapon-system concept of procurement man-
agement which has grown up in the last four years. Although the emphasis is on the
economics of weapons, it is essential to take into account the national security con-
siderations which compel a distinction between the market for these goods and that
which prevails in normal commercial contracts.
Special contract and legal considerations are not included here. Instead, this
paper deals only with the economic and national security considerations and does
not treat with either the legal or moral issues involved.
I
MAGNITUDE OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SINCE 1940
The national annual volume of business has expanded fourfold since 1940; during
this same period, national security expenditures have expanded at a much more rapid
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rate.1 From a level of $iooooooooooo in i94o, the gross national product has grown
to $434,ooo,oooooo in 1957, a growth of over 300 per cent. During this same period,
national security expenditures which amounted to only $2,ooooooooo in 194o had
grown to $46,ooooooooo in 1957 or more than twenty times the 1940 level. The
annual changes in gross national product and in national security expenditures over
this eighteen-year period are shown in table one and portrayed in chart one below.
TABLE I
GRoss NATIONAL PRODUCT AND NATIONAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES, 1940-57
(billions of dollars)
Gross National National Security Gross National National Security
Year Product Expenditures Year Product Expenditures
1940 $100.6 $ 2.2 1950 $285.1 $18.5
1941 125.8 13.8 1951 328.2 37.3
1942 159.1 49.6 1952 345.4 48.8
1943 192.5 80.4 1953 363.2 51.5
1944 211.4 88.6 1954 361.2 43.1
1945 213.6 75.9 1955 391.7 41.3
1946 209.2 21.2 1956 414.7 42.4
1947 232.2 13.3 1957 434.4 45.7
1948 257.3 16.0
1949 257.3 19.3
zouneE: U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July 1957, p. 9, and Feb. 1958, p. 8.
National security expenditures today represent a greater economic force than
any other single major activity. The volume approximates the combined sales of
the nine largest United States industrial corporations. It is greater than that of the
automobile industry or the railroads. Only residential housing and public con-
struction even approach in economic significance the military total. As a conse-
quence of this magnitude of business, there has developed a new importance for the
specialized firms doing business with the military in products like airframes, ships,
and electronics, etc. Although the list includes many long-established large firms such
as General Motors, General Electric, and Westinghouse, many other firms have de-
veloped a new economic importance in servicing the military in recent years. A few
cases may be useful in illustrating this point. Table two demonstrates the growth
and sharp fluctuations in sales volume by firms whose activity is chiefly in supplying
the military. Chart two shows these data from 1940 through 1957 for several illustra-
tive cases: an aircraft company, a shipbuilding firm, and an electronics manufacturer.
II
DorNG Busr~ss wITH THE MILITARY
Although at first glance it might seem that doing business with the military
would be no different from commercial transactions with other customers, closer
scrutiny will indicate some highly specialized conditions which make considerations of
S1The expenditure data cited here have not been adjusted for changes in the value of the dollar.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
CHART I
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND NATIONAL SECURITY EXPENDITURES (UNADJUSTED)*
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*In order to compare the rates of change, the data are presented on a semilogarithmic, or ratio, scale.
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TABLE II
NET SALES OF 25 COMPANIES WITH LARGE PROPORTIONS OF MILITARY BUSINESS, 1950-57
(millions of dollars)
Total
Military
Company Contracts NET SALES
7-1-50- -
12-31-55 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950
Boeing Airplane Co ................... $5957 $1596 $1006 $ 854 $1024 $ 912 $ 732 $ 337 $ 307
United Aircraft Corp ................. 4465 1234 954 699 655 818 668 418 270
Douglas Aircraft Co .................. 3992 1091 1074 868 915 874 523 225 130
North American Aviation Inc .......... 3631 1244 914 817 646 635 315 178 143
General Dynamics Corp .............. 3517 1563 1083 731 764 693 618 482 372
Lockheed Aircraft Corp ............... 3308 868 743 674 733 820 438 237 173
Curtiss-Wright Corp .................. 2294 599 571 509 475 439 326 177 136
Republic Aviation Corp ............... 2270 269 346 547 324 412 412 130 58
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.... 1445 205 198 213 235 241 220 168 102
Sperry-Rand Corp................. 1406 871 711 699 690 632 468 350 252
Bendix Aviation Corp ................. 1342 711 581 567 608 638 509 340 219
Martin Co ........................... 1191 424 359 272 271 208 144 68 40
Northrop Aircraft Inc ................. 985 281 322 283 172 184 187 90 44
McDonnell Aircraft Corp .............. 866 335 186 155 123 134 82 67 39
Alco Products Inc .................... 769 161 170 121 187 441 340 235 139
Kaiser Industries Corp ................ 765 376 266 164 212 359 203 146 238
Fairchild Engine and Airplane Co ...... 644 159 155 154 140 170 142 75 60
Bell Aircraft Corp .................... 503 202 216 204 186 146 129 82 36
Hercules Powder Co .................. 478 255 244 234 195 197 188 222 166
Raytheon Manufacturing Co ........... 434 240 176 182 177 179 111 90 60
Merrit-Chapman & Scott Corp ......... 432 348 365 360 146 70 45 51 38
Collins Radio Co ..................... 399 124 125 108 90 80 64 19 13
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Co ......................... 393 178 118 123 150 157 147 89 52
Textron American Inc ................ 367 255 246 192 100 71 99 98 88
Vertol Aircraft Corp .................. 329 77 90 58 49 87 64 26 6
*Totals for General Dynamics Corp. and Sperry-Rand Corp. include totals of major merged companies prior to merger.
Souncrs: Sales from MooDY'S MfAlUAL oF INVo s=Ts STANDA:D CoRPonAmON RcoRns; miiltary contract totals from
House Select Committee on Small Business, Final Report, H. R. Rep. No. 2970, 84th Cong., 2d Sere. 171-73 (1957).
success or failure quite different in the military market from those in normal trade.
These involve, for example, the kinds of goods and specifications for them required
by the services, the multiple decision processes involved in placing orders, historical
attitudes towards the selection of vendors, and the violent fluctuations in total volume
resulting from changes in the thinking of the Executive or the Congress regarding
the level of expenditures that should be permitted in support of the armed forces.
Knowing what the military wants usually involves more than just contacting
the buyers and looking at periodically published lists of contracts to be let. In order
to be equal to or ahead of our potential enemies, the military demands continually
press against the outer perimeter of both the current and the expected state-of-the-art
made possible by science and technology. This means that most of the items of equip-
ment which the armed services want can be supplied only by vendors who engage in
extensive and expensive research and development programs.
The growth in importance and cost of research and development in recent years
has meant that very few companies can themselves undertake the financial risks
involved and, as a result,. that most of the research and development is financed by
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CHART II
NET SALES OF THREE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
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the Government. Even if there had not been a well-developed practice of placing
procurement contracts with the firm which had done the research and development,
technical and financial considerations might have forced such a relationship. In any
event, there are relatively few suppliers-if any-who could undertake the delivery
of finished weapons on the time schedules required if they had not actively partici-
pated in research and development for the selected item or one closely related to it.
In addition to design and knowledge related thereto, pushing the state-of-the-art
involves specifications with respect to precision, new materials, and new fabricating
processing which, again, seriously limit the ability of many companies to compete.
Although there is a tendency to think of such machine marvels as color TV and auto-
matic gear shifts as new, if we stop and think for a moment, the older ones among
us will remember the twenty years or more between the first projection of these ideas
and their introduction on the commercial market. The military cannot wait twenty
years for the performance reliability and reasonable cost which are more or less nor-
mal in the commercial realm. Even though the businessman must think of the possi-
bility of a competitor getting the jump on him, he does not have to think of the
devastating and horrifying results- of an error in decision which confront the Joint
Chiefs of Staff when they are for the first time presented with the scientific possi-
bility of creating a revolutionary new weapon. Although there are conditions under
which this new capability can be achieved just a few steps beyond the existing
state-of-the-art, in most cases, the projection means moving in a few years to a point
to which normal commercial evolution would have brought us in twenty or more
years.
Partly because of the very advanced ideas, but to a larger extent because of the
nature of the legal and administrative procedures established by the Government and
the military, selling to the armed services is not a simple and straightforward task.
The military cannot know the quantity of an item it wants until it has reasonable
assurance of its performance. Since the capability is based upon the realization of an
as yet unestablished state-of-the-art, no one can know how good or worthwhile the
proposal is until after an extensive test program. Under these circumstances, de-
cisions to buy are a mixture of optimism, knowledge, and willingness to take numer-
ous types of risks. As research and development becomes more and more expensive,
cost considerations have become increasingly important. In any event, it is not easy to
get a yes-or-no decision with respect to either the item or its quantity.
Requirements for the item will be changed continuously, as hopes are tempered by
experience. Quantities will go up and down as the pragmatic estimate of the value
of the final product changes. This process would make life commercially difficult
even if it occurred at only one point. However, in the case of the military, this
process takes place in at least four or five places, and often more.
For example, decisions affecting the eventual procurement of military equipment
may be first drawn up and reviewed at one or more levels in the using command,
bureau, or corps. Decisions thus made are referred first to the military staff of the
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appropriate headquarters in Washington and then to the Departmental Secretary's
office. Those that survive are referred to the Department of Defense and, if approved
there, to the Bureau of the Budget. It is apparent that this process will ordinarily
require numerous interactions among the offices and agencies concerned, with result-
ing delays and extensive time lags, and that the final procurement decision will often
bear little resemblance to the original proposal.
Against this multiplicity of military decision-making points, one can formulate
his own estimate of the cost of representation and presentation which must be borne
by the vendor in his search for military equipment business. When this is coupled
with the other financial considerations involved and the necessity for having the
mechanical and human capabilities to perform the job, it becomes apparent that sub-
stantial resources are required to do business with the armed services. Some
measure of the magnitudes involved and particularly the changes which have occurred
in recent years may be obtained by considering the changes in relative importance of
research and development and procurement outlays for major weapons. Research
and development costs for most types of World War II aircraft were ordinarily
measured in hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, with follow-on procure-
ment outlays in tens or hundreds of millions. Research, development, and test
on equipment such as the B-52 ran into millions, followed by procurement costs of
billions. For the ballistic missile program, development costs (including test) are
measured in billions and (depending on quantities of operational missiles procured)
may even approach the ultimate procurement outlays.
Under present institutional arrangements, the real payoff to the vendor occurs
only if the research and development effort can be converted into a procurement
contract for the finished article. Three things are especially noteworthy: (i) the
size of the research and development effort is, of itself, large; (2) the volume of pro.
curement is so large as to require very substantial resources; and (3) the growth in
research and development, together with the decline in the relative importance of
procurement, makes the financial ability to enter into research and development a
matter of prime importance.
The increase in the relative importance of the cost of research and development
is impressive and overwhelming from a commercial point of view. Although un-
classified data on research and development costs for individual weapons currently
under development are not available, the Patman Committee published a list2 of the
companies and institutions receiving the largest amounts of military research and
development contracts in fiscal years 1954-56. Table three shows these data for major
companies whose business is primarily military, together with the companies' net
worth in 1956. The magnitude of the research and development figures indicates
that in many cases, the effort would be beyond the capability of a small firm and
' House Select Committee on Small Business, Final Report, H.R. REP. No. 2970, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
17r-73 (1957).
ECONOMICs OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
TABLE III
TWENTY COMPANIES WITH LARGE_ PROPORTIONS OF MILITARY BUSINESS: MILITARY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTS AND NET WORTH
(millions of dollars)
Military Research and Devel-
opment Contracts Fiscal
Company Years 1954-56 Net Worth 1956
North American Aviation ................ $421 $153
Boeing Airplane Co ...................... 212 149
General Dynamics ....................... 169 143
Martin Co .............................. 136 64
Bell Aircraft Corp ....................... 134 39
Aerojet General ......................... 115 16
Northrop Aircraft, Inc .................... 105 28
Curtiss-Wright Corp ..................... 98 183
Lockheed Aircraft Corp ................... 84 107
Sperry-Rand Corp ....................... 83 254
Raytheon Manufacturing Co .............. 71 43
United Aircraft Corp ..................... 67 219
Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc ................. 39 153
Bendix Aviation Corp .................... 34 177
McDonnell Aircraft Corp ................. 32 28
Chance Vought Aircraft .................. 32 29
Republic Aviation Corp .................. 30 46
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp ......... 25 37
Thiokol Corp ............................ 21 6
Ryan Aeronautical ...................... 17 11
*Parent corporations and subsidiaries not consolidated in all cases.
soURcEs: Research and Development contract totals from House Select Committee on Small Business, Final Report, H. IL Rep.
No. 2970, 84t Cong., 2d Ses& 87 (1957); net worth from MooDY's M=,ALs oP IsrvEsTsssrs.
that in others, if they were, indeed, undertaken and proved unsuccessful, the result
would be financial catastrophe.
There may be some who will experience a feeling of dismay toward these high
costs of research and development, especially when they may tend to drive smaller
concerns out of the market as prime contractors. It should be recognized, however,
that unlike production, where timing and volume can be calculated fairly well in
advance, research and development is very often an attempt to exploit a chain of
reasoning which rests in part on proved scientific principles, in part on plausible
hypotheses, and in part on intuition or informed opinion on the part of specialists.
Added to this usually are requirements for retention of high strength of materials
under increasingly high temperature, finer and finer tolerances of fit, and the
highest attainable level of reliability. The combination of all these means, in eco-
nomic terms, the need to build and staff highly specialized laboratories and to support
them for periods of unpredictable length, while a high-priced scientific and engineer-
ing staff, supported by skilled craftsmen, run down one promising lead after another.
There is very little that is predictable in this process; there is no way of guaranteeing
results.
In addition to the types of problems involved in selling the military which have
been enumerated above, there is another and perhaps more potent condition arising
from the nature of our annual budget-making process. In times of crisis, as in
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World War II and Korea, there is a tendency for Congress and the Executive to
make huge sums of money available to the military. When the crisis is over, there
is a very real desire to cut taxes and move towards balancing the budget and, there-
fore, to cut back on military expenditures. The change in weapons procurement from
194o-45, as compared to i945-5o, is striking. In terms of what we can expect in the
cold war, the changes that have occurred since 195o are probably even more significant.
(See chart one.)
From a commercial point of view, the important thing is the large volume of
business and numbers of vendors that are brought in during the crisis expansion.
When the cutback takes place, this naturally hits not only the established vendors,
but more particularly the new vendors who have just gotten started. This means
then that the usual changes in executive and congressional policy with respect to
expenditures for military weapons produce a feast-or-famine condition which makes
commercial survival extremely difficult. The sum of all these conditions means that
it is not easy to do business with the military; this is reflected in the attitude of the
bankers and the investment fraternity towards financing military vendors. Perhaps
equally noteworthy is the oft-repeated attitude of companies who can employ their
resources for nonmilitary purposes. After one or two sessions of doing business with
the military, some will say, "never again."
III
WEAPON-SYSTEM CONCEPT
Within the last few years, beginning notably with the Air Force procurement of
the B-5 8 bomber in 1954, the so-called weapon-system concept has become important.
The change here is particularly noteworthy, since it means placing the total system
responsibility (excluding only power plant in the case of the B5 8) in the hands of
a single source. Prior to this time, the major components-such as airframe,
bombardment-navigation system, or communications equipment-were bought from
separate sources and were Government-furnished equipment to be incorporated in
the final product by the airframe producer. Under the weapon-system concept,
these items become contractor-furnished equipment, and a single vendor assumes
complete responsibility for the total system. In varying degree, this concept has now
been applied to other major Air Force procurements such as the B-7o, the F-ro8, and
the Atlas, Titan, and Thor.
There are two major reasons for this new way of buying weapons.
First, the mating or system-integration problem-that is, the combining of the
various components into the final assembly-becomes more and more severe as
weapon-system complexity increases. Obviously, when separate producers are de-
veloping each of the component items, in the course of the years that elapse from
initial projection to delivery, the search for high performance may lead to departures
from specification and configuration that will make mating well-nigh impossible.
This becomes particularly important in airborne vehicles, where the search for weight
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and space savings is extremely important and the configuration of the final structure
has a marked effect on total performance.
Second, there are operational problems which cannot be taken fully into account
in evaluating the separate articles. It is only as a total system that the equipment
is operational and all the problems involved in both its airborne and ground handling
activities become apparent. Let us develop these two points.
As the military moved toward the more and more advanced equipment, they
have repeatedly encountered situations in which one component meets or exceeds the
original specifications and another falls behind by a wide margin. Under these
circumstances, the final system-integration usually produces an article which suffers
from the lowest level of component achievement. To deal with this problem and
to ensure greater compatibility of the components, the weapon-system concept has
developed with the hope of insuring capability of the final assembly. There has been
considerable discussion and negative criticism of this approach because it reduces the
number of prime contractors and places a great deal of economic power in the hand
of the successful bidder.3
Although this might be commercially undesirable, none the less the objectives and
purposes of the weapon-system concept are desirable. If we can, in fact, achieve a
more uniform state of progress, particularly in the sense that we can boost the lag-
gards, and since the weapon-system concept seems to facilitate the joining program,
there is much to be said in favor of this way of doing business. In a race for sci-
entific and technical supremacy, it is important not only that each of the components
be of advanced design, but more important that the final product be capable of the
utilization of their separate achievements.
As indicated earlier, modern research and development has become very big
business. In fact, as indicated in table three, the expenditures involved frequently
far exceed the net worth of the designer. In addition, the skills involved usually
go beyond the capabilities of a single company. As a consequence, there is now
a tendency for various companies to form groups in which they bid on the weapon-
system proposal. Under the newly developing scheme, each company takes its
specialized part and makes a contribution both technically and resource-wise to the
combine, although the end product is viewed essentially as a single weapon-system
contract. The economic effect under the new condition is substantially the same
as that of the previous method of weapon-system procurement management.
IV
ECONOMIC ROLE OF SMALL BUsINEss
According to data recently released by the Department of Defense,4 about twenty
per cent of the net value of all military prime contracts during fiscal years 1951-57
'For a discussion of the weapon-system concept, see NEIL E. HARLAN, MANAGEMENT CONTROL IN
AIRFRME SUBcoNTRACTINo 251-53 (1956).
'Ass'T SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SUPPLY AND LoGwsTICs), U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY PRIME
CONTRACTS WITH SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER COMPETITORS, FISCAL YEAR 1957 SUMMARY (957). In
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have been awarded to small business firms. As indicated in table four, the proportion
of military business going to small business differs markedly among the three military
departments, amounting in fiscal year x957 to about forty per cent for the Army,
twenty per cent for the Navy, and eight per cent for the Air Force. This reflects the
predominance of aircraft, missiles, ships, and other heavy equipment in Air Force
and Navy procurement and, in Army procurement, the greater proportion of items
not requiring large specialized manufacturing facilities.
The differences by type of commodity procured are shown more clearly in table
five. As would be expected, the heavy concentration of awards to small business has
been in civilian-type production-construction, textiles, and clothing, subsistence, and
so forth. For major items of military equipment, small business participation in
prime contracts (in fiscal year 1957) ranged from 13.5 per cent for ships to only
1.9 per cent for guided missiles and 0.4 per cent for airframes and related assemblies.
These percentages, it should be noted, reflect only prime contracts awarded by the
military. If summary data were available showing small business' participation by
way of subcontracts or through the sale of parts, components, materials, services, etc.
to the prime contractors, the percentages would be very substantially higher for most
types of major equipment.5
To the extent that small business wishes to expand its role as a prime contractor,
it must be able to meet the economic requirements for doing business with the
military which have been indicated in the preceding sections. This means being
able to undertake the types of research and development essential to make equipment
proposals to the armed services or having a sufficiently advanced manufacturing
capability to meet the specifications for new materials, products, and processes if
the design which the military requires has been developed by another firm.
For some types of products, particularly simple items of electronics and the like,
small business may be able to compete. On the other hand, for most of the articles-
particularly end items and major components-the resource requirement is so sub-
stantial that it is unlikely that a firm which meets the small business definition can
be in a position to compete with large firms. In doing business with the military,
the normal commercial difficulties are compounded by the multiple decision-making
points which must give the go-ahead before the Government can proceed and by the
difficulties of decision implicit in the projection of the state-of-the-art which char-
acterizes most future weapons. This means continued representation and presenta-
tion on the part of the vendor, with the high costs and risks that go with it.
Again, substantial resources are usually required.
this compilation, "small business firms" are defined as "concerns which are not dominant in their fields
of operation and which, together with their affiliates employ fewer than 5oo persons, and those with 5oo
or more employees which have been certified by the Small Business Administration as small business
firms."
'For a discussion of subcontracting in the airframe industry, see JoHN S. DAY, SucorrACrTNo
POLICY IN THE AIRFRAME INDUSTrRy esp. 321-27 (1956); HARLAN, op. Cit. supra note 3. For a statement
of the Air Force policy, see Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
tions on H.R. 12738, 85 th Cong., 2d Sess. 897, 907 et seq. (1958).
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The historic practice of the military departments of giving a production contract
to a firm that has done the research and development means that in terms of modern
weapons, a potential supplier must be able to finance a substantial research and
development effort. Although the Government eventually pays for most of these
outlays, the problems of financing them are none the less real and are only possible
for firms of substantial size. Again, the production of the finished articles reaches a
dollar volume which is beyond the financing capacities of most small firms.
Even when the small firm, either by its own efforts or by entering into a combina-
tion with others, is able to meet the difficulties outlined above, it still runs an
extraordinary risk resulting from our start-and-stop, stop-and-start policy on military
expenditures. If there were a continuity either in the total volume or in dollars
devoted to specific end products, it is possible that small business could work its way
into military procurement just as it has into the supplying of commercial articles.
However, when the Executive and the Congress change their minds so frequently,
and with the volume impact that has taken place in recent years, the risks become
almost unacceptable for the small firm.
Although the weapon-system concept has been singled out recently as a special
ogre for the small businessman, it does not appear that this introduces any greater
difficulties than are already presented in the existing system of military procurement.
Even if it did, the primary objective of the weapon-system concept-that is, the
earlier and more complete fulfillment of goals-would indicate that national security
should be given first consideration in evaluating its impact on small business.
TABLE IV
SMALL BUSINESS PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT BY DEPARTMENT
Fiscal Years 1951-57
Total
Fiscal Year Military Army Navy* Air Force
Total 1951-57 ................ 19.3% 32.3% 20.0% 7.5%
1951 ................... 20.9 29.8 16.3 9.9
1952 ................... 17.0 21.2 22.7 5.7
1953 ................... 16.6 36.5 19.4 4.5
1954 ................... 25.3 76.5 21.1 10.3
1955 ................... 21.5 42.6 18.8 9.1
1956 ................... 19.6 43.7 19.7 8.3
1957 ................... 19.6 40.6 20.8 8.2
*Includes procurement actions of the Military Petroleum Supply Agency and its predecessor the Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing
AgeeCE: AWs'T SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SUPPLY AlND LOGISTICS), U. S. DEs'P. or DEFENSE, MILITARY PRIME CoNTRAScrS WITH
SMAL BuSINEs AND OTHE CORracAcroas, FISCAL YEAR 1957 SUmARY 10 (1957).
CONCLUSION
The nature of modern weapons and their importance to the national security of
our nation makes the economics of weapons development and procurement a primary
national issue. As we push upon the scientific, technical, and fabricating states-of-the-
arts, it becomes both more difficult and more expensive to meet the requirements
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SMALL BUSINESS
TABLE V
PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT ACTIONS OF $10,000 OR MoRE
wiTH BUSINESS FIRMS BY PROCUREMENT PROGRAM
Fiscal Years 1955-1957
Average for
Rank Program Title 1955-57 1955 1956 1957
1 Construction ......................... 66.8% 65.5% 71.8% 63.6%
2 Military Building Supplies ............. 65.3 74.0 68.2 54.3
3 Textiles, Clothing & Equipage ......... 60.2 50.7 67.2 61.3
4 Subsistence...' 52.9 52.7 56.0 50.3
5 Petroleum Containers & Handling5
Equipment ....................... 51.6 84.5 85.9 26.2
6 Fuels & Lubricants Other Than
Petroleum ........................ 50.0 59.7 56.4 42.0
7 Construction Equipment .............. 46.4 54.9 42.5 18.7
8 Miscellaneous Supplies & Equipment.. 44.1 43.6 41.1 48.0
9 Photographic Equipment & Supplies... 36.0 35.8 40.7 31.2
10 Materials Handling Equipment ........ 35.4 33.1 45.5 31.2
11 Medical & Dental Supplies & Equipment 32.8 38.1 29.8 31.2
12 Transportation Equipment ............ 26.2 25.7 31.1 13.4
13 Petroleum ........................... 20.2 12.4 20.7 22.8
14 Non-Combat Vehicles ................. 19.9 18.0 25.1 18.1
15 Services ............................. 16.5 36.5 12.3 9.7
16 Ammunition ......................... 15.6 15.0 18.2 14.4
17 Ships ............................... 13.7 15.7 12.5 13.5
18 Electronics & Communication Equipment 10.3 11.8 10.2 9.4
19 W eapons ............................ 9.9 12.1 11.3 6.1
20 Production Equipment ................ 8.9 9.2 5.3 24.1
21 Miscellaneous Aircraft Equipment &
Supplies .......................... 7.3 7.9 6.7 7.4
22 Combat Vehicles ..................... 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.2
23 Guided Missiles ...................... 2.2 2.9 2.1 1.9
24 Aircraft Engines & Related Spares ...... 1.0 0.7 0.8 1.9
25 Airframes & Related Assemblies ........ 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4
Somc: A9S'T SECRETARY OF DEYENnm (SUPPLY AND LooxSrcs), U. S. Dmr. or DrnENsn, MumrrAnY PiE Co hraus w=n
SAL BusheAs ANDmss= CommACrORs, FscAL. YEsa 1957 SUXUAY 11 (1057).
for defending the country. The cost of research and development has reached major
proportions. The investment required to do business with the Government is very
large. Having the ability to supply the procurement demands for modern weapons
thus involves very substantial resources on the part of the vendor.
Although military procurement is a major economic force in this country today,
it does not seem possible quickly or easily to design the nature of this process away
from large-scale enterprise. Even if some of the resource-demanding features such
as representation and presentation were rationalized and made cheaper, two other
conditions would make it difficult for small enterprise to compete. One of these
is in the very nature of the process-that is, the tremendous resource requirement in-
volved either in research and development or in production. The other is a political
matter which neither the Executive nor the Congress has given any indication of an
ability or willingness to solve-the stop-and-go or feast-or-famine programming of
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funds for national security. It is not unlikely that from the small business point of
view, this last is the most critical consideration. If the federal government were
to lay on a long-range program for procurement of military end products, then
small business might be able to find a way to get into the business. That means
projections beyond the two and three years that we now make. Perhaps most
important of all, it would require that we recognize the continuity of the prepared-
ness effort and establish a minimum procurement level for something like the next
ten years. If that were done, there would be a stability in the weapons business that
would facilitate the appropriate commercial planning, and in such a situation, small
business should be able to get its share.
